Incentive Centered Design : Incentives Pay
Comparative Evaluation
Should performance be based on performance of
1. co workers
2. performance of workers elsewhere
3. performance of other companies
2. "Not fair" agent can't control what others do
but can act as a performance indicator.
Information Intensity Principle
If pay takes the form t(z,y) = alpha + beta(z+gy) then beta measure the intensity of the incentives: how much pay varies with effort
Optimal intensity depends on four factors:
1. incremental profits from addl effort
2. precision of estimating effort
3. agent's risk tolerance
4. agent's responsiveness to incentives.
Monitoring intensity principle
1. Spend more on improving monitoring when incentive intensity Beta is higher.
If principle can invest in better measurement/monitoring, then if incentive intensity of high then it is better to have more precise measures of performance.
Should performance be based on performance of
1. co workers
2. performance of workers elsewhere
3. performance of other companies
2. "Not fair" agent can't control what others do
but can act as a performance indicator.
Information Intensity Principle
If pay takes the form t(z,y) = alpha + beta(z+gy) then beta measure the intensity of the incentives: how much pay varies with effort
Optimal intensity depends on four factors:
1. incremental profits from addl effort
2. precision of estimating effort
3. agent's risk tolerance
4. agent's responsiveness to incentives.
Monitoring intensity principle
1. Spend more on improving monitoring when incentive intensity Beta is higher.
If principle can invest in better measurement/monitoring, then if incentive intensity of high then it is better to have more precise measures of performance.
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